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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jason Lee Burgess appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Commitment.
After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Mr. Burgess entered a conditional
plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled substance.

Mr. Burgess

asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because
his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, protected by the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the
Idaho Constitution, was violated when law enforcement officers improperly arrested him
without a warrant or probable cause and, as such, the evidence derived from the
improper seizure must be suppressed.
Furthermore, Mr. Burgess asserts that the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing

him to

an

excessive

sentence without giving

proper weight and

consideration to the mitigating factors in his case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 29, 2010, an Information was filed charging Mr. Burgess with
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.

{R., pp.28-29.) The State

later filed an Information Part 11, charging Mr. Burgess with being a persistent violator of
the law. (R., pp.92-94.)
Mr. Burgess filed a Motion to Suppress asserting that evidence was seized as a
"result of an illegal arrest perpetrated by police." (R., pp.47-48.) In the Memorandum in
Support, Mr. Burgess asserted that officers arrested him prior to the issuance of an
agent's warrant and without probable cause. (R., pp.64-70.) Because the arrest was

1

illegal, he asserted that all evidence found in the subsequent search was a fruit of the
illegal government activity and must be suppressed. (R., pp.64-70.)
The State objected to the suppression motion. (R., pp.49-50.) The State argued
in its Memorandum in Support, that Mr. Burgess had waived his 4 th Amendment rights
as a condition of parole, as result he had a diminished expectation of privacy, and that
the search was allowed by the terms and conditions of Mr. Burgess' parole release
agreement. (R., pp.82-84.)
The district court held a hearing on the motion.

(R., pp.95-100.) Mr. Burgess

testified first and noted that he was arrested without being presented an arrest warrant.
(Tr.3/2/11, p.7, L.1 - p .. 8, L.13.) He also acknowledged that he was on parole and had
consented to searches of his person or property at any time, any place, by any agent of
Field and Community Services. (Tr.3/2/11, p.9, L.2 - p.10, L.8.)
The next witness was Ms. Tanya Shaw.

Ms. Shaw testified that she was not

Mr. Burgess' parole officer, but was on call during the arrest and search in question.
(Tr.3/2/11, p.14, L.1 - p.15, L.11.)

Ms. Shaw received a phone call from Officer

Beaudoin and she authorized Mr. Burgess' arrest by telling the officer to arrest him on
an agent's warrant and to search him subject to his waiver. (Tr.3/2/11, p.15, L.9 - p.17,
L.23.) Ms. Shaw acknowledged that she gave Officer Beaudoin verbal permission to
arrest, but did not issue an agent's warrant until after the arrest. (Tr.3/2/11, p.22, L.7 p.25, L.19.) Ms. Shaw also stated that she was using Officer Beaudoin as an agent of
Field and Community Services that day. (Tr.3/2/11, p.34, Ls.12-23.)
Officer Beaudoin also testified. He noted that he was on duty, located
Mr. Burgess, arrested Mr. Burgess after being told to do so based upon an agent's
warrant that would be issued if Mr. Burgess was located, and that he did not have other
2

independent grounds to arrest Mr. Burgess. (Tr.3/2/11, p.42, L7 - p.44, L.22.) After
arresting Mr. Burgess, Officer Beaudoin waited while a drug dog was used, the dog
alerted, he then called Ms. Shaw again and asked for permission to search a computer
bag that had been alerted on, Officer Beaudoin was given permission by Ms. Shaw to
conduct the search.

(Tr.3/2/11, p.54, L.19 - p.55, L.18, p.58, Ls.7-15.)

Officer

Beaudoin was aware of the Fourth Amendment waiver and was working at the direction
of Ms. Shaw that day. (Tr.3/2/11, p.66, L. 18 - p.67, L.6.)
Following argument by counsel, the suppression motion was denied during the
hearing. (R., pp.95-100.) Specifically, the district court found that:
Further I believe it is within the scope of the law and not
unreasonable that a police officer in the field is entitled to rely upon verbal
conversations or test messages or however they communicate, but
Local law
communications with agents of probation and parole.
enforcement is and should be entitled to act in good faith on the
information received from probation and parole and aid probation and
parole in the conduct of their duties.
The natural consequence of that finding is that Officer Beaudoin
and the other Boise Police officers at the scene were acting lawfully at the
time they stopped and detained the defendant. There was nothing illegal
about this detention.
They were further acting under the lawful direction of an agent of
probation and parole in searching the bag in conducting whatever search
they conducted at the scene.
The search was legal either because it was done with respect to
the bag at the request and direction of probation and parole. It was also
done incident to a lawful arrest. . . . if any error occurred in Officer
Beaudoin's activity in stopping, detaining, and taking the defendant into
custody, that error was cured by the later issuance of the agent's warrant,
the actual issuance.
(Tr.3/2/11, p.111, L.5 - p.113, L.6.)
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Mr. Burgess then entered a conditional guilty plea to the possession of
rnethamphetamine charge, reserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of
the suppression motion.

(R., pp.102-104.)

At the sentencing hearing, the State

recommended a sentence of seven years.

(Tr.3/29/11, p.18, Ls.22-24.) Defense

counsel requested a unified sentence of five years, with one and half years fixed.
(Tr.3/29/11, p.27, Ls.1-3.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years,
with two years fixed. (R., pp.119-121.) Mr. Burgess filed a Notice of Appeal timely from
the district court's Judgment of Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.124-126.)
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Burgess' motion to suppress?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
seven years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Burgess following his plea of guilty to
possession of a controlled substance?

5

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Burgess' Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Burgess' right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was

violated when officers illegally arrested him.

The State failed to meet its burden of

proof, failing to show that the officer had legal grounds for the arrest of Mr. Burgess and,
as such, the district court's order denying Mr. Burgess' motion to suppress should be
reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho

336, 338 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are accepted;
however, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found are freely
reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 886 (2001 ). At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh evidence, resolve factual conflicts
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.

State v. Valdez-Molina, 127

Idaho 102, 106 (1995).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Burgess' Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. The purpose of these constitutional
rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by
6

governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against
arbitrary invasions."

State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)). The United States Supreme Court
has held that when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding
against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347
(1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961 ); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914)).
Mindful of Sampson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and Mr. Burgess' Fourth
Amendment parole waiver, wherein he consented to searches of his person or property
at any time, any place, by any agent of Field and Community Services, Mr. Burgess
asserts that all evidence discovered as a result of the search following his illegal arrest
must be suppressed as a fruit of illegal government activity.

1.

The Arrest Of Mr. Burgess Was Illegal

Idaho Code § 20-227 governs arrests of parolees without a warrant.

The

relevant portion states that:
(1) Any parole or probation officer may arrest a parolee ... without a
warrant, or may deputize any other officer with power of arrest to do so, by
giving such officer a written statement hereafter referred to as an agent's
warrant, setting forth that the parolee ... has, in the judgment of said
parole or probation officer, violated the conditions of ... his parole or
probation.
I.C. § 20-227.
In the case at hand, the arrest of Mr. Burgess was illegal. At the suppression
hearing, Officer Beaudoin acknowledged that Mr. Burgess was arrested only on the
basis that the parole department was going to issue an agent's warrant, not on other
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independent grounds. (Tr.3/2/11, p.42, L.7 - p.44, L.22.) Ms. Shaw, a parole officer,
acknowledged that she gave Officer Beaudoin verbal permission to arrest, but did not
issue an agent's warrant until after the arrest.

(Tr.3/2/11, p.22, L. 7 - p.25, L.19.)

Because Ms. Shaw did not authorize Officer Beaudoin in writing, in the form of an
agent's warrant, to arrest Mr. Burgess, the arrest does not comport with I.C. § 20-227
and is, therefore, illegal.

2.

All Evidence Collected Against l\/lr. Burgess Following The Illegal Arrest
Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activity

The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 815 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v.

Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is "whether, granting establishment of
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint."

Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting MAGUIRE,

EVIDENCE OF GUilT, p. 221 (1959)). Suppression is required only if "the evidence
sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the government's
unconstitutional conduct."

State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005)

(quoting U.S. v. Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d 1128, 1131 (2000)).
In the case at hand, the above argument shows that Mr. Burgess was illegally
arrested.

Had Mr. Burgess not been illegally arrested, the evidence located in the

vehicle would not have been discovered. The State failed to meet its burden in showing
that the evidence is untainted; therefore, all the evidence collected after the
impermissible seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police activity.
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II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Seven
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Burgess Following His Plea Of Guilty To
Possession Of A Controlled Substance
Mr. Burgess asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of
seven years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Burgess does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, Mr. Burgess must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120

Idaho 141, 145 (1991 ), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v.
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)).
Mr. Burgess asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the
mitigating factors that exist in his case. Specifically, he asserts that the district court
failed to give proper consideration to his admitted substance abuse problem and desire
9

for treatment.

Idaho courts have previously recognized that substance abuse and a

desire for treatment should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court
when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982), see also State

v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Mr. Burgess first began using alcohol at the age of six or seven. (PSI, p.148.)
Later in life he recognized that his drinking was becoming a problem, he then stopped
drinking. (PSI, p.149.) At the age of seven he began using marijuana, with daily use
beginning at the age of eight. (PSI, p.149.) Methamphetamine use began at the age of
eighteen and increased over time. (PSI, p.149.) Mr. Burgess expressed a desire for
treatment during the sentencing hearing. (Tr.3/29/11, p.33, Ls.23-25.)
Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code§ 19-2523 requires the
trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor.
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).

Hollon v.

Mr. Burgess has been previously diagnosed as

suffering from Depressive disorder NOA and Post-traumatic stress disorder.

(PSI,

p.150.) Mr. Burgess grew up with a very abusive father. (PSI, p.6.) In 1985, his father
committed suicide and Mr. Burgess acknowledges that there is likely a strong
connection between his childhood and this traumatic event and his self-destructive
behaviors. (PSI, pp.6-7.)
Furthermore, in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the
Court's decision as to what is an appropriate sentence. Id. Mr. Burgess has the support
of his family. In the past, Sharon Hill, Mr. Burgess' mother has proven to be continually
supportive. (PSI, pp.6, 144.) Mrs. Crystal Burgess, Mr. Burgess' wife wrote a letter of
support for her husband noting his substance abuse issues and need for treatment to
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be successful. (Letter from Crystal Burgess.) She also noted that she recently gave
birth to a daughter and that she is confident that Mr. Burgess will change his life and be
successful for his daughter. (Letter from Crystal Burgess.) John Lopez, Mr. Burgess'
step-son also wrote a letter of support noting that he supports and believes in
Mr. Burgess. (Letter from John Lopez.)

Debra Olive, Jason's mother-in-law asked that

Mr. Burgess be allowed an opportunity for treatment and noted that "I believe Jason is
ready, willing, and able to do whatever it takes to straighten out his life and future."
(Letter from Debra Olive.)
Additionally, Mr. Burgess has taken responsibility for his actions in committing
the instant offense. In State v. Alberls, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991 ), the Idaho Court
of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, "In light of Alberts' expression of remorse for
his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other
positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204. At the sentencing hearing,
Mr. Burgess stated that:
I'd like to apologize to my family, my son and my daughter, not only
for bringing you to this hearing again and being back in court again but by
bringing you through every day of my addiction with me, for not being
there. It's not fair that you're our there with my daughter - our daughter
and that I'm not there. And it kills me.

I want you to know that, no matter what happens here today, when
I will be released, I promise you that I will get treatment. And when I get
home, I'm staying home. I'll never be gone again. Thank you, guys, for
your love and your support.
Your Honor, I'd like you to know that I do take responsibility for this
crime. There's - there's been a lot of talk about minimizing it and kind of
justifying that it's a relapse. It is that, but it is my relapse. My drug
addiction is a crime. It's a felony. I completely understand that.
That's part of the sickness of this drug and my addictions; even
understanding it, I continue to do it.
11

You know, like she said, I haven't had treatment. I've never been
through intensive treatment before. I've never been strong enough on my
own to seek it, and I've just always been too far into my addiction to even
see that I needed it.

There's no way that I can look at my daughter and ever want to use
drugs again. I feel that if I was to walk out today, I'd stand a good chance,
just my daughter being in my life now alone, that I could make it. But I
know that I need treatment because I don't - I don't want to miss another
second.
The hardest thing I've ever had to do in my life was sit in a prison
cell while my daughter was being born. I couldn't use the phone. I
couldn't be there to talk to her. I couldn't be there for my wife, anything.

There's so many things that's happened in my life since my
incarceration that I never thought I would ever have the experience of ever
having to feel. I will never let an addiction or anything make me go though
this again. I'll be there everyday for the rest of my life for my family.

I believe that I need treatment. ... The bottom line is I need help.
I've never been strong enough or smart enough to do it on my own. I'm
asking you to please give me the help that I need.
(Tr.3/29/11, p.28, L.14 - p.33, L.25.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Burgess asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts
that had the district court properly considered his substance abuse, desire for continued
treatment, mental health issues, friend and family support, and remorse, it would have
crafted a less severe sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Burgess respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
of judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to
suppress.

Alternatively, he requests that that this Court reduce his sentence as it

deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 5th day of October, 2011.

ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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